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Abstract. We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in In-
ternet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the
allocation and payments have been decided, withdraw some of her false-name
identities (have some of her false-name identities refuse to pay). While these
withdrawn identities will not obtain the items they won, their initial presence
may have been beneficial to the agent’s other identities. We define a mechanism
to be false-name-proof with withdrawal (FNPW) if the aforementioned manipula-
tion is never beneficial. FNPW is a stronger condition than false-name-proofness
(FNP).
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of electronic commerce, Internet auctions have become
increasingly popular over the years [8, 15, 12]. Unlike traditional auctions, typical In-
ternet auctions pose no geographical constraint. That is, sellers and bidders from all
over the world can participate in an Internet auction remotely over the Internet, without
having to physically attend the auction event. For sellers, this reduces the cost of run-
ning an auction. For bidders, this lowers the entry cost. Effectively, in an individually
rational auction mechanism (a mechanism that guarantees nonnegative utilities for the
agents), a bidder, at worst, loses nothing (but time) by participating in an auction. On
the one hand, this encourages more bidders to join the auction, which potentially leads
to higher revenue for the seller, as well as a higher social welfare for the bidders. On the
other hand, it enables the bidders to manipulate by submitting multiple bids via multiple
fictitious identities (e.g., user accounts linked to different e-mail addresses).
The line of research on preventing manipulation via multiple fictitious identities
in Internet auctions was explicitly framed by the groundbreaking work of Yokoo et
al. [19]. Extending strategy-proofness—the concept of ensuring that it is always in a
bidder’s best interest to report her valuation function truthfully—the authors define an
auction mechanism to be false-name-proof (FNP) if the mechanism is not only strategy-
proof, but also, under this mechanism, an agent cannot benefit from submitting multiple
bids under false names (fictitious identities). The authors also extended the revelation
principle [9] to incorporate false-name-proofness. That is (roughly stated), in settings
where false-name bids are possible, it is without loss of generality to focus only on
false-name-proof mechanisms.
Focusing primarily on combinatorial auctions, this paper continues the line of re-
search on false-name-proofness by considering an even more powerful variant of false-
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name manipulation: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the
allocation and payments have been decided, withdraw some of her false-name identities
(have some of her false-name identities refuse to pay). While these withdrawn identities
will not obtain the items they won, their initial presence may have been beneficial to the
agent’s other identities, as shown in the following example:
Example 1. There are three single-minded agents 1, 2, 3 and two items A,B. Agent 1
bids 4 on {A,B}. Agent 2 bids 2 on {B}. Let us analyze the strategic options for agent
3, who is single-minded on {A}, with valuation 1. (That is, ∀S ⊆ {A,B}, agent 3’s
valuation for S is 1 if and only if {A} ⊆ S.) The mechanism under consideration is the
VCG mechanism.
If agent 3 reports truthfully, then she wins nothing and pays nothing. Her resulting
utility equals 0.
If agent 3 attempts “traditional” false-name manipulation, that is, submitting multi-
ple false-name bids, and honoring all of them at the end, then her utility is still at most
0: if 3 wins both items with one identity, then she has to pay at least 4 (while her valua-
tion for the items is only 1); if 3 wins both items with two identities (one item for each
identity), then the identity winning {B} has to pay at least 2; if 3 wins only {B} or
nothing, then her utility is at most 0; if 3 wins only {A} (in which case {B} has to be
won by agent 2), then 3’s winning identity’s payment equals the other identities’ overall
valuation for {A,B} (at least 4), minus 2’s valuation for {B} (which equals 2). That is,
in this case, 3 has to pay at least 2. So, overall, 3’s utility is at most 0 if she honors all
her bids.
However, agent 3 can actually benefit from submitting multiple false-name bids, as
long as she can withdraw some of them. For example, 3 can use two identities, 3a and
3b. 3a bids 1 on {A}. 3b bids 4 on {B}. At the end, 3a wins {A} for free, and 3b wins
{B} for 2. If 3 can withdraw identity 3b (e.g., by never checking that e-mail account
anymore), never making the payment and never collecting {B}, then, she has obtained
{A} for free, resulting in a utility of 1.
If we wish to guard against manipulations like the above, we need to extend the
false-name-proofness condition. We refer to the new condition as false-name-proofness
with withdrawal (FNPW). It requires that, regardless of what other agents do, an agent’s
optimal strategy is to report truthfully using a single identity, even if she has the option
to submit multiple false-name bids, and withdraw some of them at the end of the auc-
tion.
Whether this stronger version of false-name-proofness is more or less reasonable
than the original version depends on the context. First of all, bid withdrawal is a com-
mon example of strategic bidding and has been observed in real-life auctions such as
the FCC Spectrum Auctions [10, 11, 5, 3]. That is, bid withdrawal is a threat that we
can not ignore. Then, in some sense, false-name manipulation and bid withdrawal go
hand in hand—in highly-anonymous settings where agents can easily create multiple
fictitious identities, agents generally can also easily discard their fictitious identities
(without needing to worry about reputations or lawsuits). From these perspectives, it is
reasonable to study FNPW mechanisms. In any case, FNPW is a useful conceptual tool
for analyzing false-name-proof mechanisms. Indeed, this paper also contributes to the
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research on false-name-proofness in the traditional sense. Since FNPW is stronger than
FNP, the results in this paper, such as the mechanism proposed, should be of interest in
the FNP context as well.
On the other hand, people may argue that there are two natural measures to prevent
bid withdrawal, as shown below:
– Require each identifier to pay a certain amount of deposit before the auction begins.
If an identifier withdraws, then her deposit is forfeited.
– If any identifier withdraws, then we reallocate according to certain reallocation rules
(e.g., run the original auction again).
However, while discouraging bid withdrawal, both measures lead to other problems.
The problem of the first measure is that small deposits may not be enough to discourage
bid withdrawal, while large deposits may significantly discourage participation (e.g., an
agent may be willing to sell some of her assets to gather enough cash to pay for the items
once she wins, but may not be willing to sell her assets just for paying for the deposit).
Also, when there are many participants and few potential winners, it is unnecessary
and costly to collect everyone’s deposit. The problem of the second measure is that 1)
After reallocation, an agent who did not withdraw may end up with worse result than
before. That is, an agent may be punished by others’ faults. 2) It may take some time
before the auctioneer figures out that a reallocation is needed (e.g., it is the transaction
deadline, but there are still winners who haven’t paid). That is, reallocation may be late
(e.g., the items expired or the bids expired). 3) An agent may submit many false-name
bids. After the initial result comes out, she may get some idea of the other agents’ bids.
Then, this agent can withdraw all her false-name bids, except for the one bid that is the
best response to the other agents’ bids.1 In light of the above, in this paper, we focus
on mechanisms that discourage bid withdrawal in the first place, without resorting to
charging deposit or reallocation.
2 Related Research and Contributions
The main topic of this paper is the comparison between FNP and FNPW. FNPW is cer-
tainly more restricted, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that FNPW is less interesting.
It could be that FNPW is only slightly more restricted and much more structured. This
is what we are trying to find out. Our results on FNPW and their comparison against
previous results on FNP are summarized below:
Yokoo [16] and Todo et al. [13] characterized the payment rules and the allocation
rules of FNP mechanisms in general combinatorial auctions, respectively. We present
similar results on the characterization of FNPW mechanisms. As was in the case of FNP,
the characterization of FNPW payment rules is useful for proving a given mechanism
to be FNPW, while the characterization of FNPW allocation rules is useful for proving
a given mechanism to be not FNPW.
1 This type of manipulation was studied in [11].
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With our characterizations, we are able to prove whether an existing FNP mecha-
nism is FNPW or not.2 There are three known FNP mechanisms for general combina-
torial auction settings. These are the Set mechanism [16], the Minimal Bundle (MB)
mechanism [16], and the Leveled Division Set (LDS) mechanism [18].3 We show that
both Set and MB are FNPW, while LDS is not. We also show that the VCG mechanism
is FNPW if and only if the type space satisfies the submodularity condition (with a mi-
nor assumption). Previously, Yokoo et al. [19] showed that the submodularity condition
is sufficient for the VCG mechanism to be FNP.
We then compare the worst-case efficiency ratios of FNP and FNPW mechanisms.
Iwasaki et al. [6] showed that, under a minor condition, the worst-case efficiency ratio
of any feasible FNP mechanism is at most 2
m+1 . We show that under the same condition,
the worst-case efficiency ratio of any feasible FNPW mechanism is at most 1
m
.
Table 1. FNP v.s. FNPW
Characterization of Characterization of Set, MB, LDS Worst-case
payment rules allocation rules VCG w. submodularity efficiency ratio
FNP NSA[16] Sub-additivity[13] Yes[16], Yes[16],Yes[18] 2
m+1
[6]
Weak-monotonicity Yes[19]
FNPW NSAW Sub-additivity Yes, Yes, No 1
m
(S-NSAW) Weak-monotonicity Yes
Withdrawal-monotonicity
At the end, we propose the maximum marginal value item pricing (MMVIP) mech-
anism. We show that MMVIP is FNPW and exhibits some desirable properties. Since
FNPW is stronger than FNP, MMVIP also adds to the set of known FNP mechanisms.
Finally, in Appendix B, we propose an (exponential-time) automated mechanism
design technique that transforms any feasible mechanism into a FNPW mechanism,
and prove some basic properties about this technique. We also give a characterization
of FNP(W) social choice rules in Appendix C.
3 Formalization
We will use the following notation:
– N = {1, 2, . . . , n}: the set of agents
– G = {1, 2, . . . ,m}: the set of items
– Θ: the type space of each agent
– θi ∈ Θ: agent i’s reported type (since we consider only strategy-proof mechanisms,
when there is no ambiguity, we also use θi to denote i’s true type)
2 It should be noted that the characterizations are helpful, but definitely not necessary for prov-
ing whether an existing FNP mechanism is FNPW or not. For example, we could always try
to use counter examples to show that a mechanism is not FNPW.
3 A very recent paper [6] introduced another mechanism called the ARP mechanism. However,
this mechanism requires the additional restriction that agents are single-minded.
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– −i: the set of agents other than agent i
– θ−i ∈ Θn−1: types reported by agents other than agent i
We study combinatorial auction settings satisfying the following assumptions:
– Each agent has a quasi-linear utility function. That is, there exists a function v (deter-
mined by the setting) such that if an agent with true type θ ∈ Θ ends up with bundle
B ⊂ G and payment p ∈ R, then her utility equals v(θ,B) − p.
– ∀θ ∈ Θ, we have v(θ, ∅) = 0.
– ∀B1 ⊆ B2 ⊆ G, ∀θ ∈ Θ, we have v(θ,B1) ≤ v(θ,B2). That is, there is free
disposal.
– An agent can have any valuation function satisfying the above conditions. That is, we
are dealing with rich domains [1]. It should be noted that in Section 5, we study how
restrictive the type space has to be in order for the VCG mechanism to be FNPW. That
is, we do not have the rich-domain assumption in Section 5, which is an exception.
A mechanism consists of an allocation ruleX : (Θ,Θn−1)→ P(G) and a payment
rule P : (Θ,Θn−1) → R. X(θi, θ−i) is the bundle agent i receives when reporting θi
(when the other agents report θ−i). P (θi, θ−i) is the payment agent i has to make when
reporting θi (when the other agents report θ−i). When there is no ambiguity about
the other agents’ types, we simply use X(θi) and P (θi) in place of X(θi, θ−i) and
P (θi, θ−i).
Throughout the paper, we only consider mechanisms satisfying the following con-
ditions:
– Strategy-proofness: ∀θi, θ′i, θ−i, we have v(θi, X(θi)) − P (θi) ≥ v(θi, X(θ′i)) −
P (θ′i). That is, if an agent uses only one identity, then truthful reporting is a dominant
strategy.
– Pay-only: ∀θi, θ−i, we have P (θi) ≥ 0.
– Individual rationality: ∀θi, θ−i, we have v(θi, X(θi)) − P (θi) ≥ 0. That is, if an
agent reports truthfully, then her utility is guaranteed to be nonnegative. This condi-
tion also implies that if an agent does not win any items, or has valuation 0 for all the
items, then her payment must be 0.
– Consumer sovereignty: ∀θ−i, ∀B ⊆ G, there exists θi ∈ Θ such that X(θi, θ−i) ⊇
B. That is, no matter what the other agents bid, an agent can always win any bundle
(possibly at the cost of a large payment).
– Determinism and symmetry: We only consider deterministic mechanisms that are
symmetric over both the agents and the items (except for ties).
Yokoo [16] showed that in our setting, the mechanisms satisfying the above con-
ditions coincide with the (anonymous) price-oriented, rationing-free (PORF) mecha-
nisms. Similar price-based representations have also been presented by others, includ-
ing [7]. The PORF mechanisms work as follows:
– The agents submit their reported types.
– The mechanism is characterized by a price function χ : P(G)×Θn−1 → [0,∞). For
any agent i, for any multiset θ−i of types reported by the other agents, for any set of
items S ⊆ G, χ(S, θ−i) is the price of S offered to i by the mechanism. That is, i can
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purchase S at a price of χ(S, θ−i). ∀θ−i, we have χ(∅, θ−i) = 0. That is, the price
of nothing is always zero. ∀θ−i, ∀S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ G, we have χ(S1, θ−i) ≤ χ(S2, θ−i).
That is, a larger bundle always has a higher (or the same) price.
– The mechanism will select a bundle for agent i that is optimal for her given the prices,
that is, the bundle chosen for i is in argmaxS⊆G{v(θi, S) − χ(S, θ−i)}. The agent
then pays the price for this bundle.
– Naturally, the mechanism must ensure that no item is allocated to two different
agents. This involves setting prices carefully, as well as breaking ties.
Since all feasible mechanisms (mechanisms that satisfy the desirable conditions in
our setting) are PORF mechanisms, besides using X (the allocation rule) and P (the
payment rule) to refer to a mechanism, we can also use the price function χ to refer to
a mechanism, namely, the PORF mechanism with price function χ.4
In the remainder of this section, we formally define the traditional false-name-
proofness (FNP) condition, as well as our new false-name-proofness with withdrawal
(FNPW) condition.
Definition 1. FNP. A mechanism characterized by allocation rule X and payment rule
P is FNP if and only if it satisfies the following:
∀θi, ∀θi1, θi2, . . . , θik , ∀θ−i, we have
v(θi, X(θi, θ−i))− P (θi, θ−i) ≥
v(θi,
k⋃
j=1
X(θij , θ−i ∪ (
⋃
t6=j
θit))) −
k∑
j=1
P (θij , θ−i ∪ (
⋃
t6=j
θit))
That is, truthful reporting using a single identifier is always better than submitting
multiple false-name bids.
Definition 2. FNPW. A mechanism characterized by allocation rule X and payment
rule P is FNPW if and only if it satisfies the following:
∀θi, ∀θi1, θi2, . . . , θik, ∀θ′i1, θ
′
i2, . . . , θ
′
iq , ∀θ−i, we have
v(θi, X(θi, θ−i))− P (θi, θ−i) ≥
v(θi,
k⋃
j=1
X(θij , θ−i ∪ (
⋃
t6=j
θit) ∪ (
⋃
θ′it))) −
k∑
j=1
P (θij , θ−i ∪ (
⋃
t6=j
θit) ∪ (
⋃
θ′it))
That is, truthful reporting using a single identifier is always better than submitting
multiple false-name bids and then withdrawing some of them.
It is easy to see that FNPW is equivalent to FNP plus the following condition: an
agent’s utility for reporting truthfully does not increase if we add another agent.
4 Characterization of FNPW mechanisms
Yokoo [16] and Todo et al. [13] characterized the payment rules (the price functions in
the PORF representation) and the allocation rules of FNP mechanisms, respectively. In
this section, we present similar results on the characterization of FNPW mechanisms.
4 Technically, there can be multiple PORF mechanisms with the same price function due to
tie-breaking, but this will generally not be an issue.
False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal 7
4.1 Characterizing FNPW payments
We recall that in our setting, a feasible mechanism corresponds to a PORF mechanism,
characterized by a price function χ. Yokoo [16] gave the following sufficient and nec-
essary condition on χ for the mechanism characterized by χ to be FNP.
Definition 3. No superadditive price increase (NSA) [16]. Let O be an arbitrary set
of agents.5 We run mechanism χ (a PORF mechanism characterized by price function
χ) for the agents in O. Let Y be an arbitrary subset of O. Let Bi (i ∈ Y ) be the set of
items agent i obtains. We must have
∑
i∈Y
χ(Bi, O − {i}) ≥ χ(
⋃
i∈Y
Bi, O − Y ).
By modifying the NSA condition, we get the following sufficient and necessary
condition on χ for mechanism χ to be FNPW.
Definition 4. No superadditive price increase with withdrawal (NSAW). Let O be
an arbitrary set of agents. We run mechanism χ for the agents in O. Let Y and Z be
two arbitrary nonintersecting subsets of O. Let Bi (i ∈ Y ) be the set of items agent i
obtains. We must have
∑
i∈Y
χ(Bi, O − {i}) ≥ χ(
⋃
i∈Y
Bi, O − Y − Z).
Theorem 1. Mechanism χ is FNPW if and only if χ satisfies the NSAW condition.
4.2 A sufficient condition for FNPW
The NSAW condition in Section 4.1 leads to the following sufficient condition for
mechanism χ to be FNPW.
Definition 5. Sufficient condition for no superadditive price increase with with-
drawal (S-NSAW). Let O be an arbitrary set of agents. S-NSAW holds if we have both
of the following conditions:
– Discounts for larger bundles (DLB). ∀S1, S2 ⊆ G with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, χ(S1, O) +
χ(S2, O) ≥ χ(S1 ∪S2, O). That is, the sum of the prices of two disjoint sets of items
must be at least the price of the joint set.
– Prices increase with agents (PIA). ∀S ⊆ G, for any agent a that is not in O,
χ(S,O ∪ {a}) ≥ χ(S,O). That is, from the perspective of agent i, if another agent
joins in, then the price i faces for any set of items must (weakly) increase.
Proposition 1. Mechanism χ is FNPW if χ satisfies S-NSAW.
S-NSAW is a cleaner, but more restrictive condition than NSAW. (To see why, note
that even if DLB does not hold, NSA may still hold: even if χ(S1, O) + χ(S2, O) <
χ(S1 ∪ S2, O), it may be the case that by putting separate bids on S1 and S2, each of
these bids makes the price for the other bundle go up, so that the result is still more
expensive than buying S1 ∪ S2 as a single bundle.) We find it easier to use S-NSAW
5 In a slight abuse of language, we also use “a set of agents” to refer to the types reported by
this set of agents.
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to prove that a mechanism is FNPW (rather than using the more complex NSAW con-
dition).6 Let us recall the three existing FNP mechanisms (for general combinatorial
auction settings): the Set mechanism, the MB Mechanism, and the LDS mechanism.
With the help of S-NSAW, we can prove that both Set and MB are FNPW.
Proposition 2. Both the Set mechanism and the MB mechanism satisfy the S-NSAW
condition. Hence, they are FNPW.
The Set mechanism simply combines all the items into a grand bundle. The grand
bundle is then sold in a Vickrey auction. The MB (Minimal Bundle) mechanism builds
on the concept of minimal bundles. A set of items S (∅ ( S ⊂ G) is called a minimal
bundle for agent i if and only if ∀S′ ( S, v(i, S) > v(i, S′). Under the MB mech-
anism, the price of a bundle S an agent faces is equal to the highest valuation value
of a bundle, which is minimal and conflicting with S. Generally, MB coincides with
Set, because usually the grand bundle is a minimal bundle for every agent (any smaller
bundle usually gives at least slightly lower utility). The proof of the above proposition
is straightforward.
We will also use S-NSAW to prove that the MMVIP mechanism that we pro-
pose (Section 7) is FNPW. The automated mechanism design technique for generating
FNPW mechanisms (Appendix B) is also based on S-NSAW.
4.3 Characterizing FNPW allocations
Todo et al. [13] gave the following characterization of the allocation rules of FNP mech-
anisms. We recall that X(θi, θ−i) is the set of items that agent i wins if her reported
type is θi and the reported types of the other agents are θ−i. To simplify notation, we
use X(θi) in place of X(θi, θ−i) when there is no risk of ambiguity.
Definition 6. Weak-monotonicity [1]. X is weakly monotone if ∀θi, θ′i, θ−i, we have
v(θi, X(θi))− v(θi, X(θ′i)) ≥ v(θ
′
i, X(θi))− v(θ
′
i, X(θ
′
i)).
Definition 7. Sub-additivity [13]. ∀θi, ∀θ′i, ∀θi1, θi2, . . . , θik , ∀θ′i1, θ′i2, . . . , θ′ik, ∀θ−i,
we have the following:
X(θi) =
k⋃
l=1
X+Ik
−l
(θil), v(θ
′
i, X(θ
′
i)) = 0
X+Ik
−l
(θ′il) ⊇ X+Ik
−l
(θil), v(θ
′
il, X+Ik
−l
(θ′il)) = v(θ
′
il, X+Ik
−l
(θil))
⇓
v(θ′i, X(θi)) ≤
k∑
l=1
v(θ′il, X+Ik
−l
(θil)).
Here, X+Ik
−l
(θil) is short for X(θil, θ−i ∪ (
⋃
1≤t≤k,t6=l
θit)).
X+Ik
−l
(θ′il) is short for X(θ′il, θ−i ∪ (
⋃
1≤t≤k,t6=l
θit)).
6 However, S-NSAW cannot be used to prove that a mechanism is not FNPW, because it is a
more restrictive condition.
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X is said to be FNP-implementable if there exists a payment rule P so that X
combined with P constitutes a feasible FNP mechanism. Todo et al. [13] showed that
X is FNP-implementable if and only X satisfies both weak-monotonicity and sub-
additivity.
We define allocation rule X to be FNPW-implementable if there exists a pay-
ment rule P so that X combined with P constitutes a feasible FNPW mechanism.
We introduce a third condition called withdrawal-monotonicity. We prove that X is
FNPW-implementable if and only if X satisfies weak-monotonicity, sub-additivity, and
withdrawal-monotonicity.
Definition 8. Withdrawal-monotonicity. ∀θi, ∀θ−i, ∀θa, ∀θLi , ∀θUi , the following
holds:
v(θLi , X(θ
L
i , θ−i)) = 0, X(θ
U
i , θ−i ∪ θ
a) = X(θi, θ−i)
⇓
v(θLi , X(θi, θ−i)) ≤ v(θ
U
i , X(θi, θ−i))
Theorem 2. An allocation rule X is FNPW-implementable if and only if X satisfies
weak-monotonicity, sub-additivity, and withdrawal-monotonicity.
The above theorem implies that a necessary condition for a mechanism to be FNPW
is that its allocation ruleX satisfies withdrawal-monotonicity. That is, one way to prove
a (FNP) mechanism to be not FNPW is to generate a lot of test type profiles, and
see whether this mechanism’s allocation rule ever violates withdrawal-monotonicity
(this process can be computer-assisted). If we find one test type profile that violates
withdrawal-monotonicity, then we are sure that the mechanism under discussion is not
FNPW.7
Proposition 3. The Leveled Division Set (LDS) mechanism [18] does not satisfy
withdrawal-monotonicity. That is, LDS is not FNPW in general.
5 Restriction on the type space so that VCG is FNPW
The VCG mechanism [14, 2, 4] satisfies several nice properties, including efficiency,
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and the non-deficit property. Unfortunately,
as shown by Yokoo et al. [19], the VCG mechanism is not FNP for general type spaces.
One sufficient condition on the type space for the VCG mechanism to be FNP is as
follows:
Definition 9. Submodularity [19]. For any set of bidders Y , whose types are drawn
fromΘ, ∀S1, S2 ⊆ G, we haveU(S1, Y )+U(S2, Y ) ≥ U(S1∪S2, Y )+U(S1∩S2, Y ).
Here, U(S, Y ) is defined as the total utility of bidders in Y , if we allocate items in S to
these bidders efficiently.
7 [13] proved two mechanisms to be not FNP, by presenting type profiles that violate sub-
additivity.
10 Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer
That is, if the type space Θ satisfies the above condition, then the VCG mechanism
is FNP. In this section, we aim to characterize type spaces for which VCG is FNPW. We
consider restricted type spaces (that make the VCG mechanism FNPW) in this section.
In other sections, unless specified, we assume that the rich-domain condition holds.
Theorem 3. If the type space satisfies the submodularity condition, then the VCG mech-
anism is FNPW. Conversely, if the mechanism is FNPW, and additionally the type space
contains the additive valuations, then the type space satisfies the submodularity condi-
tion.
That is, submodularity does not only imply FNP, it actually implies FNPW. More-
over, unlike for FNP, in the case of FNPW, the converse also holds—if we allow the
additive valuations.
6 Worst-Case Efficiency Ratio of FNPW Mechanisms
Yokoo et al. [19] proved that in general combinatorial auction settings, there exists
no efficient FNP mechanisms. Iwasaki et al. [6] further showed that, under a minor
condition called IIG (described below), the worst-case efficiency ratio of any feasible
FNP mechanism is at most 2
m+1 .
8
Definition 10. Independence of irrelevant good (IIG) [6]. Suppose agent i is winning
all the items. If we add an additional item that is only wanted by i, then i still wins all
the items.
Given the agents’ reported types, the efficiency ratio of a mechanism is defined
as the ratio between the achieved allocative efficiency and the optimal allocative effi-
ciency (payments are not taken into consideration). The worst-case efficiency ratio of
this mechanism is the minimal such ratio over all possible type profiles.
Example 2. The worst-case efficiency ratio of the Set mechanism is at least 1
m
[6]. Let
v be the winning agent’s valuation for the grand bundle. The allocative efficiency of the
Set mechanism is v. The optimal allocative efficiency is at most mv, since there are at
most m winners in the optimal allocation, and a winner’s valuation (for the items she
won) is at most v.
Our next theorem is that 1
m
is a strict upper bound on the efficiency ratios of feasi-
ble FNPW mechanisms. That is, the Set mechanism is worst-case optimal in terms of
efficiency ratio. Of course, this is only a worst-case analysis, which does not preclude
FNPW mechanisms from performing well most of the time.
Theorem 4. The worst-case efficiency ratio of any feasible FNPW mechanism is at most
1
m
, if IIG holds, even with single-minded bidders.
8 Iwasaki et al. [6] also introduced the ARP mechanism, whose worst-case efficiency ratio is
exactly 2
m+1
. However, the ARP mechanism is only FNP for single-minded agents. Our next
result implies that ARP is not FNPW, even with single-minded bidders.
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7 Maximum Marginal Value Item Pricing Mechanism
In this section, we introduce a new FNPW mechanism. We recall that S-NSAW is a
sufficient condition for FNPW. Basically, if a mechanism satisfies discounts for larger
bundles (DLB) and prices increase with agents (PIA), then we know it is FNPW. Any
mechanism that uses item pricing satisfies DLB. If the item prices an agent faces also
increase with the agents, then we have a mechanism that also satisifies PIA. MMVIP
builds on exactly this item pricing idea.
Definition 11. Maximum marginal value item pricing mechanism (MMVIP). LetO
be an arbitrary set of agents. MMVIP is characterized by the following price function
χ.
– ∀S ⊆ G, χ(S,O) =
∑
s∈S χ({s}, O). That is, χ uses item pricing.9
– ∀s ∈ G, χ(s,O) = max
j∈O
max
S⊆G−{s}
{v(j, S ∪ {s})− v(j, S)}.10 That is, the price an
agent faces for an item is the maximum possible marginal value that any other agent
could have for that item, where the maximum is taken over all possible allocations.
Proposition 4. MMVIP is feasible and FNPW.
Next, we prove two properties of the MMVIP mechanism.
Proposition 5. Suppose we restrict the domain to additive valuations. Then, MMVIP
coincides with the VCG mechanism, so that MMVIP=VCG is FNPW and efficient.
The above proposition essentially says that, when the agents’ valuations are addi-
tive, MMVIP “does the right thing.” MMVIP is the only known FNP/FNPW mecha-
nism with the above property for general combinatorial auctions. Finally, we have the
following proposition about MMVIP.
Proposition 6. Among all FNPW mechanisms that use item pricing, MMVIP has mini-
mal payments. That is, let χ be the price function of MMVIP. Let χ′ be a different price
function corresponding to a different FNPW mechanism M that also uses item pric-
ing. We have that there always exists a set of items S and a set of agents O, so that
χ′(S,O) > χ(S,O).
8 Conclusion
We studied a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation: an agent can submit
multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have been decided,
withdraw some of her false-name identities. Since FNPW is stronger than FNP, this
paper also contributes to the research on false-name-proofness in the traditional sense.
9 It should be noted that the item prices faced by different agents are generally different.
10 In this notation, we assume that the maximum over an empty set is 0 (for presentation purpose).
Such notation will also appear later in the paper.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. We first prove that if χ satisfies NSAW, then the mechanism is FNPW. Let us
consider a specific agent x. Let O − Y − Z be the set of agents other than herself. Let
Y be the set of false-name identities x submits and keeps at the end. Let Z be the set
of false-name identities x submits but withdraws at the end. So, O is the set of all the
identities. The set of items x receives at the end is
⋃
i∈Y
Bi, where Bi is the bundle won
by identity i. The total price x pays is
∑
i∈Y
χ(Bi, O − {i}). According to NSAW, this
price is at least χ(
⋃
i∈Y
Bi, O − Y − Z). That is, x would not be any worse off if she
just used a single identity to buy ⋃
i∈Y
Bi. When x uses only one identity, her optimal
strategy is to report truthfully. Therefore, if NSAW is satisfied, mechanism χ is FNPW.
Next, we prove that if mechanism χ is FNPW, then χ must satisfy NSAW. Suppose
not, that is, suppose there exists some χ that corresponds to an FNPW mechanism,
and there exist three nonintersecting sets of agents Y , Z , and O − Y − Z , such that∑
i∈Y
χ(Bi, O − {i}) < χ(
⋃
i∈Y
Bi, O − Y − Z), where Bi is the bundle agent i obtains
(when we apply mechanismχ to the agents inO). Let us consider a single-minded agent
x, who values
⋃
i∈Y
Bi at exactly χ(
⋃
i∈Y
Bi, O− Y −Z). If the set of other agents faced
by x is O− Y −Z , then x has utility 0 if she reports truthfully using a single identifier.
However, if x instead submits multiple false-name identities Y + Z , keeps those in Y
and withdraws those in Z , then she will obtain her desired items at a lower price and
end up with positive utility, contradicting the assumption that χ is FNPW. That is, if
NSAW is not satisfied, then χ is not FNPW.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. We only need to show that S-NSAW is stronger than NSAW (by Theorem 1,
NSAW is sufficient (and necessary) for χ to be FNPW). Let χ satisfy S-NSAW. Let O
be an arbitrary set of agents. We run mechanism χ on the agents in O. We divideO into
three subgroups, Y , Z , and O−Y −Z . For i ∈ Y , let Bi be the bundle agent i obtains.
By PIA, we have
∑
i∈Y χ(Bi, O−{i}) ≥
∑
i∈Y χ(Bi, O−Y −Z). By DLB, we have∑
i∈Y χ(Bi, O− Y −Z) ≥ χ(
⋃
i∈Y
Bi, O− Y −Z). Combining these inequalities, we
can conclude that S-NSAW implies NSAW.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. We first prove that if X is FNPW-implementable, then X satisfies weak-
monotonicity, sub-additivity, and withdrawal-monotonicity. IfX is FNPW-implementable,
then X is also FNP-implementable. Hence, X satisfies both weak-monotonicity and
sub-additivity [13]; only withdrawal-monotonicity remains to be shown. Let χ be the
(PORF) price function corresponding to an FNPW mechanism that allocates according
to X . We denote X(θi, θ−i) by S. Since v(θLi , X(θLi , θ−i)) = 0, we have v(θLi , S) ≤
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χ(S, θ−i) (otherwise, an agent with true type θLi would be better off purchasing S).
Since X(θUi , θ−i ∪ θa) = X(θi, θ−i) = S, we have v(θUi , S) ≥ χ(S, θ−i ∪ θa) (be-
cause an agent with true type θUi is best off buying S when the other agents’ types
are θ−i ∪ θa). χ is FNPW, we must have χ(S, θ−i ∪ θa) ≥ χ(S, θ−i). Combining all
the inequalities, we get v(θUi , X(θi, θ−i)) ≥ v(θLi , X(θi, θ−i)). That is, withdrawal-
monotonicity is satisfied.
Next, we prove that ifX satisfies weak-monotonicity, sub-additivity, and withdrawal-
monotonicity, thenX is FNPW-implementable. SinceX satisfies both weak-monotonicity
and sub-additivity, X is FNP- implementable [13]. Let χ be a (PORF) price function
that characterizes an FNP mechanism that allocates according to X . We prove that χ
must also be FNPW. We only need to prove that χ satisfies PIA. That is, under χ, the
agents have no incentives to create indentifiers that will later on be discarded. Suppose
χ does not satisfy PIA. Then, there exists a set of agents O, an agent a not in O (where
a’s type is denoted by θa), and some S ⊆ G, such that χ(S,O) > χ(S,O ∪ {a}).
Let χ(S,O) − χ(S,O ∪ {a}) = β > 0. Let θ−i be the reported types of the agents
in O. Let i be an agent that is single-minded on S, with a very large valuation, so
that X(θi, θ−i) = S (we denote agent i’s type by θi). We also construct an agent
that is single-minded on S, with valuation χ(S,O) − β3 . We denote the type of this
agent by θLi . We have X(θLi , θ−i) = ∅ (she is not willing to pay χ(S,O) to purchase
S). Hence, v(θLi , X(θLi , θ−i)) = 0. We construct another agent that is also single-
minded on S, with valuation χ(S,O ∪ {a}) + β3 . We denote the type of this agent
by θUi . We have X(θUi , θ−i ∪ θa) = S = X(θi, θ−i). By withdrawal-monotonicity,
we must have v(θLi , X(θi, θ−i)) ≤ v(θUi , X(θi, θ−i)). However, on the other hand,
v(θLi , X(θi, θ−i)) = χ(S,O) −
β
3 = χ(S,O ∪ {a}) +
2β
3 > χ(S,O ∪ {a}) +
β
3 =
v(θUi , X(θi, θ−i)). We have reached a contradiction. We conclude that χ has to satisfy
PIA, which implies that χ is FNPW. Hence, X is FNPW-implementable.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. The general LDS mechanism is rather complicated. Instead of describing LDS in
its general form, we focus on a specific LDS mechanism for three items, which is char-
acterized by reserve price 1 and two levels: [{(A,B,C)}] and [{(A,B), (C)}, {(A),
(B,C)}]. The mechanism works as follows. If there are at least two agents whose val-
uations for {A,B,C} are at least 3, then we combine {A,B,C} into one bundle, and
run the Vickrey auction. If every agent’s valuation for {A,B,C} is less than 3, then we
do the following. We first introduce a dummy agent into the system. The dummy agent
has an additive valuation function and values every item at 1. We only allow five types
of allocations: 1) The dummy agent wins everything. 2) The dummy agent wins one of
{A,B} and {C}, and a non-dummy agent wins the other. 3) The dummy agent wins
one of {A} and {B,C}, and a non-dummy agent wins the other. 4) A non-dummy agent
wins one of {A,B} and {C}, and another non-dummy agent wins the other. 5) A non-
dummy agent wins one of {A} and {B,C}, and another non-dummy agent wins the
other. We run the VCG mechanism on this restricted set of possible allocations. Finally,
if there is only one agent whose valuation for {A,B,C} is at least 3, then this agent is
the only winner. She has the option to purchase all the items at price 3, or to obtain the
result she would have obtained if everyone (including the dummy agent) were to join in
the above maximal-in-range mechanism.
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We only need to prove that the above specific LDS mechanism does not satisfy
withdrawal-monotonicity. We consider the following scenario involving only types that
are single-minded. θ−i contains only one type from an agent who bids 2.2 on {A,B}.
If θi is bidding 1.3 on {A}, then X(θi, θ−i) = {A}. If θUi is bidding 1.05 on {A}, and
θa is bidding 2.9 on {B,C}, then X(θUi , θ−i ∪ θa) = {A}. If θLi is bidding 1.1 on
{A}, then X(θLi , θ−i) = ∅. That is, v(θLi , X(θLi , θ−i)) = 0. According to withdrawal-
monotonicity, we should have v(θLi , {A}) = 1.1 ≤ v(θUi , {A}) = 1.05, which is a con-
tradiction. We conclude that, in general, LDS does not satisfy withdrawal-monotonicity,
and hence is not FNPW.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof. We first prove that if the type space satisfies submodularity, then the VCG mech-
anism is FNPW. We consider agent i. Let K be the set of false-name identities i sub-
mits and keeps at the end. Let W be the set of false-name identities i submits and
withdraws. We already know that submodularity is sufficient for the VCG mechanism
to be FNP. Hence, if K contains multiple identities, then i might as well replace all
of them by one identity that reports i’s true type. We then show that the identities in
W do not help i. We use S to denote the set of items won by i at the end. To win
S, i pays the VCG price U(G, {−i} ∪ W ) − U(G − S, {−i} ∪ W ) ({−i} is the
set of other agents). We use S′ to denote the set of items won by identities in W ,
when we allocate items in G − S to identities in {−i} ∪W efficiently. We have that
U(G, {−i}∪W )−U(G−S, {−i}∪W ) = U(G, {−i}∪W )−U(G−S−S′, {−i})−
U(S′,W ) ≥ U(G − S′, {−i}) + U(S′,W ) − U(G − S − S′, {−i})− U(S′,W ) =
U(G − S′, {−i})− U(G − S − S′, {−i}). The submodularity condition implies that
U(G − S′, {−i}) − U(G − S − S′, {−i}) ≥ U(G, {−i}) − U(G − S, {−i}). But,
the expression on the right-hand side of the inequality is the price i would be charged
for S when she uses a single identifier. That is, i does not benefit from the false-name
identities in W . Therefore, the VCG mechanism is FNPW if the type space satisfies
submodularity.
Next, we prove that if the VCG mechanism is FNPW, then the type space must
satisfy submodularity (if it contains the additive valuations). Let S be an arbitrary set
of items. Let i be an agent that is interested in S. Since we allow additive valuations,
such i always exists (e.g., i may have a very large valuation for every item in S). If i
bids truthfully, then she can win S at a price of U(G, {−i})−U(G− S, {−i}). Let S′
be another arbitrary set of items that does not intersect with S. For each item j in S′,
we introduce a false-name identity that is only interested in item j, with value c, where
c is set to a very large value (e.g., larger than U(G, {−i})). These false-name identities
are allowed since we assume the type space contains the additive valuations. Let W be
the set of identities introduced. With W , i can win S at a price of U(G, {−i} ∪W )−
U(G−S, {−i}∪W ). We have that U(G, {−i}∪W )−U(G−S, {−i}∪W ) = U(G−
S′, {−i})+U(S′,W )−U(G−S−S′, {−i})−U(S′,W ) = U(G−S′, {−i})−U(G−
S − S′, {−i}). The new price should never be smaller than the old price. Otherwise,
there is an incentive for i to submit false-name bids and withdraw them. That is, we
have U(G, {−i})−U(G−S, {−i}) ≤ U(G−S′, {−i})−U(G−S−S′, {−i}). Let
S1 = G − S, S2 = G − S′, and Y = {−i}. We have U(S1 ∩ S2, Y ) − U(S1, Y ) ≤
U(S2, Y )− U(S1 ∪ S2, Y ). Since S1, S2, and Y are arbitrary, we have submodularity.
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Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. Let χ be the price function that corresponds to an FNPW mechanism with opti-
mal worst-case ratio. Since the Set mechanism is FNPW, χ’s worst-case efficiency ratio
is at least 1
m
. We denote item i by si. We consider the following types:
θa: the type of an agent that is single-minded on the grand bundle, with value 1.
θi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m): the type of an agent that is single-minded on si, with value
1− ǫ. Here, ǫ is a small positive number.
Scenario 1: There are two agents. Agent a has type θa. Agent 1 has type θ1.
Scenario 2: There are two agents. Both agents have type θ1.
Scenario 3: There are m + 1 agents. Agent a has type θa. Agent i has type θi for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
We first prove that in scenario 1, agent a wins. We start with the special case of
m = 1. If χ({s1}, {θ1}) > 1 − ǫ, then we consider scenario 2. In scenario 2, both
agents can not afford the only item. That is, the efficiency ratio is 0. Hence, we must
have χ({s1}, {θ1}) ≤ 1− ǫ. That is, in scenario 1, in the case of m = 1, agent a must
win. The IIG condition implies that this is also true for cases with m > 1.
Since agent a is the only winner in scenario 1, we have χ({s1}, {θa}) ≥ 1 − ǫ
(otherwise, agent 1 would win in scenario 1). ǫ can be made arbitrarily close to 0;
hence, χ({s1}, {θa}) ≥ 1.
Finally, we consider scenario 3. The price agent 1 faces for s1 is χ({s1}, {θa} ∪
(
⋃
j 6=1
{θj})). This price is at least χ({s1}, {θa}) = 1. That is, agent 1 does not win in
scenario 3. By symmetry over the items, agent i does not win for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The efficiency ratio in this scenario is then at most 1
m(1−ǫ) , which goes to
1
m
as ǫ goes
to 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. We first prove that MMVIP is feasible. We need to show that, with appropri-
ate tie-breaking, MMVIP will never allocate the same item to multiple agents. Let us
suppose that under MMVIP there is a scenario in which two agents, i and j, both win
item s. Let Si and Sj be the sets of other items (items other than s) that i and j win
at the end, respectively. Let vi = v(i, Si ∪ {s}) − v(i, Si). That is, vi is i’s marginal
value for s. Let vj = v(j, Sj ∪ {s})− v(j, Sj). That is, vj is j’s marginal value for s.
If vi > vj , then j has to pay at least vi to win s, which is too high for her; j is better
off not winning s. Similarly, if vi < vj , then i is better off not winning s. If vi = vj ,
then i and j both have to pay at least their marginal value for s to win s. That is, they
are either indifferent between winning s or not, or prefer not to win. The only case that
does not lead to a contradiction is where they are both indifferent; any tie-breaking rule
can resolve this conflict.
We then show that MMVIP is FNPW. By Proposition 1, we only need to prove
that the price function χ that characterizes MMVIP satisfies S-NSAW. Let O be an
arbitrary set of agents. ∀S1, S2 ⊆ G with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, we have χ(S1, O) +
χ(S2, O) = χ(S1 ∪ S2, O), because MMVIP uses item pricing. Hence, DLB is sat-
isfied. ∀S ⊆ G, for any agent a that is not in O, χ(S,O ∪ {a}) =
∑
s∈S
χ(s,O ∪ {a}) =
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∑
s∈S
max
j∈O∪{a}
max
S′⊆G−{s}
{v(j, S′∪{s})−v(j, S′)} ≥
∑
s∈S
max
j∈O
max
S′⊆G−{s}
{v(j, S′∪{s})−
v(j, S′)} =
∑
s∈S
χ(s,O) = χ(S,O). That is, PIA is also satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. When the agents’ valuations are additive, we have that MMVIP’s item price
function satisfies χ(s,O) =
max
j∈O
max
S⊆G−{s}
{v(j, S ∪ {s}) − v(j, S)} = max
j∈O
v(j, {s}). Thus, MMVIP is equiva-
lent to m separate Vickrey auctions (one Vickrey auction for each item), and hence to
VCG (which also corresponds to m separate Vickrey auctions when the valuations are
additive).
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that the proposition is false. That
is, we assume that for every set of items S and every set of agents O, we have
χ′(S,O) ≤ χ(S,O). Since χ 6= χ′, we have that there exists at least one set of
items S and one set of agents O such that χ′(S,O) < χ(S,O). Since χ′(S,O) =∑
s∈S χ
′(s,O) and χ(S,O) =
∑
s∈S χ(s,O), it follows that there exists s ∈ S such
that χ′(s,O) < χ(s,O). By the definition of MMVIP, χ(s,O) corresponds to the max-
imal marginal value of some agent j ∈ O. That is, there exists S′ ⊂ G with s /∈ S′
such that χ(s,O) = v(j, S′∪{s})−v(j, S′). We construct an agent x, whose valuation
function is additive. Let x’s valuations of items not in S′ ∪ {s} be extremely high, so
that x wins all these items under both mechanisms χ and χ′. (We recall that we assume
consumer sovereignty for FNPW mechanisms, so that χ, χ′ <∞ everywhere.) Let x’s
valuation on s be χ(s,O)− ǫ (where ǫ is small enough so that χ(s,O)− ǫ > χ′(s,O)).
Let x’s valuation of items in S′ be 0. When the set of agents consists of x and the agents
in O, we have that x wins all the items except for those in S′ under M . Since M is
FNPW, we have χ′(s,O) ≥ χ′(s, {j}). That is, when the set of agents consists of only
x and j, x also wins all the items except for those in S′ underM . Also, underM , j wins
all of S′, because for any s′ ∈ S′, we have χ′(s′, {x}) ≤ χ(s′, {x}) = 0. However, we
then have that χ′(s, {x}) ≤ χ(s, {x}) = χ(s,O) − ǫ = v(j, S′ ∪ {s})− v(j, S′) − ǫ,
so that j would choose to also win s when facing x under M . That is, under M , when
the set of agents consists of only x and j, s is won by both agents, contradicting the
assumption that M is feasible. Thus, assuming that the proposition is false leads to a
contradiction.
B Automated FNPW Mechanism Design
In this section, we propose an automated mechanism design (AMD) technique that
transforms any feasible mechanism into an FNPW mechanism. In our setting, a feasible
mechanism is characterized by a price function χ. We start with any χ that corresponds
to a feasible mechanism (e.g., the price function of the VCG mechanism). Our technique
modifies χ so that it satisfies S-NSAW, while maintaining feasibility.
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We recall that for general combinatorial auction settings, there are three known
FNPW mechanisms (Set, MB, and MMVIP), and four known FNP mechanisms (the
aforementioned three mechanisms, plus LDS). Though computationally expensive (like
many other AMD techniques in other contexts), this technique has the potential to en-
large the set of known FNPW (FNP) mechanisms. By designing tiny instances of FNPW
mechanisms via automated mechanism design, we may get a better understanding of
the structure of FNPW mechanisms, from which we can then conjecture FNPW mech-
anisms in analytical form. Later in this section, we show that in a specific setting, by
starting with the VCG mechanism, the AMD technique produces exactly the MMVIP
mechanism. That is, had we not known the MMVIP mechanism, the AMD technique
could have helped us find it (though it just so happened that we discovered MMVIP be-
fore the AMD technique). It remains an open question of whether new, general FNPW
mechanisms can be found in this way.
Let H : Θk → [0,∞) be a function that maps any set of agents O (more precisely,
their reported types) to a nonnegative number H(O). For any feasible mechanism χ,
we define χH as follows:
– For any set of agents O, ∀∅ ( S ⊆ G, χH(S,O) = χ(S,O) +H(O).
– For any set of agents O, χH(∅, O) = χ(∅, O) = 0.
That is, moving from χ to χH , if we fix the reported types of the other agents O,
then we are essentially increasing the price of every nonempty set of items by the same
amount, while keeping the price of ∅ at 0.
Lemma 1. [17] ∀ feasible χ, ∀H , χH is feasible.
This lemma was first proved in [17].11 An agent is allocated her favorite set of
items (the set that maximizes valuation minus payment) in (PORF) mechanism χ. From
the perspective of agent i, the set of types reported by the other agents θ−i is fixed.
That is, for i, under χH , the price of every nonempty set of items is increased by the
same amount H(θ−i). Hence, agent i’s favorite set of items is either unchanged, or has
become ∅ (ifH(θ−i) is too large). It is thus easy to see that if χ never allocates the same
item to more than one agent, then neither does χH . That is, feasibility is not affected.12
Theorem 5. ∀ feasible χ, we define the following H . For any set of agents O, H(O)
equals the maximum of the following two values:
– max
S1,S2⊆G,S1∩S2=∅
{χ(S1 ∪ S2, O)− χ(S1, O) − χ(S2, O)}
11 The GM-SMA mechanism [17] relies on this property. However, it has been shown that GM-
SMA is not FNP in [13].
12 If the agents are single-minded, then in a PORF mechanism, as long as the prices of larger
sets of items are more expensive, an agent’s favorite set of items is either the set on which
she is single-minded, or the empty set. Thus, we do not need to increase the price of every
set by the same amount. As long as we are increasing the prices, an agent’s favorite set either
remains unchanged, or becomes empty (if the price increase on the set on which she is single-
minded is too high). That is, for single-minded agents, we have more flexibility in the process
of transforming a feasible mechanism into an FNPW mechanism. Due to space constraint, we
do not pursue this further here.
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– max
∅(S⊆G,j∈O
{χ(S,O − {j}) +H(O − {j})− χ(S,O)}
We have that χH is FNPW.
It should be noted that, for any O, the first expression in the theorem is at least
0 (setting S1 = S2 = ∅). That is, H never takes negative values. χH is feasible by
Lemma 1.
Proof. We prove that χH satisfies S-NSAW. By Proposition 1, this suffices to show that
χH is FNPW.
Proof of DLB: Let O be an arbitrary set of agents. ∀S1, S2 ⊆ G with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅,
we prove that χH(S1, O) + χH(S2, O) ≥ χH(S1 ∪ S2, O). If at least one of S1 and
S2 is empty, then w.l.o.g., we assume S1 = ∅. In this case, χH(S1, O) + χH(S2, O) =
χH(S2, O) = χ
H(S1∪S2, O). If neither S1 nor S2 is empty, then we haveχH(S1, O)+
χH(S2, O) − χH(S1 ∪ S2, O) = H(O) + χ(S1, O) + χ(S2, O) − χ(S1 ∪ S2, O) ≥
H(O)− max
S′
1
∩S′
2
=∅
{χ(S′1 ∪ S
′
2, O)− χ(S
′
1, O)− χ(S
′
2, O)} ≥ 0.
Proof of PIA: Let O be an arbitrary set of agents. Let a be an agent that is not in
O. If S is empty, then we have χH(S,O ∪ {a}) = χH(S,O) = 0. ∀∅ ( S ⊆ G,
χH(S,O ∪ {a}) = H(O ∪ {a}) + χ(S,O ∪ {a}) ≥ (χ(S,O) +H(S,O)− χ(S,O ∪
{a})) + χ(S,O ∪ {a}) = χH(S,O).
This still leaves the question of how to compute the H described in the theorem; we
address this next. Given χ, for any agent i and any set of other types θ−i, we compute
H(θ−i) using the following dynamic programming algorithm.
For t = 0, 1, . . . , |θ−i|
For any T ⊆ θ−i with |T | = t
h1 = max
S1,S2⊆G,S1∩S2=∅
{χ(S1 ∪ S2, T )− χ(S1, T )− χ(S2, T )}.
h2 = max
∅(S⊆G,j∈T
{H(T − {j}) + χ(S, T − {j})− χ(S, T )}.
H(T ) = max{h1, h2}.
Proposition 7. If we apply the AMD technique to a mechanism that already satisfies
S-NSAW, the mechanism remains unchanged.
We use the phrase “the AMD mechanism” to denote the mechanism generated by
the AMD technique starting from VCG (though the AMD technique is not restricted to
starting from VCG). Next, we prove a proposition that is similar to Proposition 5.
Proposition 8. When we restrict the preference domain to additive valuations, the
MMVIP, the VCG, and the AMD mechanism all coincide.
Proof. Proposition 5 already shows that MMVIP and VCG coincide. All that remains to
show is that VCG already satisfies S-NSAW, so that by Proposition 7, AMD is also the
same. When the agents’ valuations are additive, the VCG mechanism’s price function
χ is defined as follows: for any set of items S ⊂ G and any set of additive agents O,
χ(S,O) =
∑
s∈S x
s
, where xs is the highest valuation for item s among the agents in
O. It is easy to see that χ satisfies S-NSAW.
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Moreover, the next proposition shows that in settings with exactly two substitutable
items, the AMD mechanism coincides with MMVIP (but not with VCG).
Proposition 9. In settings with exactly two substitutable items, the AMD mechanism
coincides with MMVIP.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of agents. When there is only one agent,
this agent faces price 0 for every bundle under the VCG mechanism. This already sat-
isfies S-NSAW, so by Proposition 7, we do not need to increase any price in the AMD
process. Therefore, when n = 1, the AMD mechanism allocates all the items to the
only agent for free. The MMVIP mechanism does the same. Hence, when n = 1, the
AMD mechanism coincides with MMVIP. For the induction step, we assume that the
two mechanisms coincide when n ≤ k. When n = k + 1, the price function of the
VCG mechanism is defined as: χ({A}, O) = v∗AB − v∗B , χ({B}, O) = v∗AB − v∗A,
and χ({AB}, O) = v∗AB . Here, A and B are the two items. v∗A is the highest val-
uation for A by the agents in O. v∗B is the highest valuation for B by the agents
in O. v∗AB is the highest combined valuation for {A,B} by the agents in O (which
may be obtained by splitting the items across two different agents, or giving both to
the same agent). Since the items are substitutable, v∗AB ≤ v∗A + v∗B . Equivalently,
χ({A}, O) + χ({B}, O) ≤ χ({AB}, O). Therefore, in the AMD technique, the price
of every bundle has to increase by at least χ({A,B}, 0) − χ({A}, O) − χ({B}, O).
That is, under the AMD mechanism, the price of A is at least v∗A, the price of B is at
least v∗B , and the price of {A,B} is at least v∗A + v∗B . These prices are high enough to
guarantee the PIA condition, because by the induction assumption, the AMD mecha-
nism coincides with MMVIP for n ≤ k; so, it follows that the AMD technique results
in exactly these prices. They coincide with the prices under the MMVIP mechanism.
Therefore, by induction, the AMD mechanism coincides with the MMVIP mechanism
for any number of agents, when there are exactly two substitutable items.
It remains an open question whether there are more general settings in which the
AMD mechanism and the MMVIP mechanism coincide.
Finally, we compare the revenue and allocative efficiency of the VCG mechanism,
the Set mechanism13, the MMVIP mechanism, and the AMD mechanism. It should be
noted that the VCG mechanism is not FNPW in general. We use it as a benchmark.
We consider a combinatorial auction with two items {A,B} and five agents {1, 2,
. . . , 5}.14 We denote agent i’s valuation for set S ⊆ {A,B} by vSi . We consider two
scenarios, one with valuations displaying substitutability, and the other with valuations
displaying complementarity. We randomly generate 1000 instances for each scenario.
Valuations with substitutability: The v{A}i and the v
{B}
i are drawn independently
from U(0, 1) (the uniform distribution from 0 to 1). For all i, v{A,B}i is drawn indepen-
dently from U(max{v{A}i , v
{B}
i }, v
{A}
i + v
{B}
i ). In this scenario, AMD and MMVIP
13 The MB mechanism and the Set mechanism coincide in our experimental setup (the whole
bundle is every agent’s minimal bundle).
14 We only focused on these tiny auctions because the AMD technique is computationally quite
expensive. Nevertheless, even the solutions to tiny auctions can be helpful in conjecturing
more general mechanisms.
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coincide. They perform better than the Set mechanism, both in terms of revenue and
allocative efficiency.
VCG Set AMD MMVIP
Revenue 1.285 1.002 1.221 1.221
Efficiency 1.668 1.236 1.550 1.550
Valuations with complementarity: The v{A}i and the v
{B}
i are still drawn indepen-
dently from U(0, 1). For all i, v{A,B}i is set to be (v
{A}
i + v
{B}
i )(1 + xi), where the
xi are also drawn independently from U(0, 1). It turns out that, in this scenario, Set
performs better than AMD and MMVIP, both in terms of revenue and allocative effi-
ciency. (MMVIP performs especially poorly when valuations exhibit complementarity,
because every item can potentially have a very large marginal value to another agent,
leading to prices that are too high.)
VCG Set AMD MMVIP
Revenue 1.864 1.849 1.288 0.594
Efficiency 2.372 2.365 1.565 0.721
Thus, when there are two items and five agents, among these FNPW mechanisms,
it seems that Set is most desirable if it likely that there is significant complementarity,
and AMD is most desirable if it is likely that there is substitutability. (We cannot use
the VCG mechanism unless we are certain that the type space makes VCG FNPW.)
C Characterizing FNP(W) in Social Choice Settings
Throughout the paper, we have only discussed combinatorial auctions. In this section,
we focus on FNP(W)15 in social choice settings (without payments). Specifically, we
present a characterization of FNP(W) social choice functions (without payments). A
social choice function f is defined as f : {∅} ∪ Θ ∪ Θ2 ∪ . . . → Ω, where Θ is the
space of all possible types of an agent, and {∅}∪Θ∪Θ2∪. . . is the space of all possible
profiles (since we do not know how many agents there are). Ω is the outcome space.
Let agent i’s type be θi. Let the types of agents other than i be θ−i. i’s valuation for
outcome ω ∈ Ω is denoted by vi(θi, ω).
First, we present the following straightforward characterization of strategy-proof
social choice functions.
Proposition 10. A social choice function f is strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the
following condition: ∀i, θi, θ−i, we have f(θi, θ−i) ∈ argmaxθ′
i
vi(θi, f(θ
′
i, θ−i)).
Proof. If the above condition is satisfied, then ∀i, θi, θ′i, θ−i, we have vi(θi, f(θi, θ−i)) ≥
vi(θi, f(θ
′
i, θ−i)). That is, reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy.
If reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy, then ∀i, θi, θ′i, θ−i, we have
vi(θi, f(θi, θ−i)) ≥ vi(θi, f(θ′i, θ−i)). That is, ∀i, θi, θ−i, we have vi(θi, f(θi, θ−i)) ≥
maxθ′
i
vi(θi, f(θ
′
i, θ−i)), which is equivalent to f(θi, θ−i) ∈ argmaxθ′i vi(θi, f(θ
′
i, θ−i)).
15 In these settings, it does not matter whether withdrawal is allowed or not.
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That is, an agent always receives her most-preferred choice among outcomes that
she can attain with some type report. We are now ready to present the characterization
of FNP(W) social choice functions.
Proposition 11. Suppose that for every outcome o ∈ Ω, there exists some type θi ∈ Θ
such that {o} =
argmaxo′∈O uθi(o
′) (each o is the unique most-preferred outcome for some type).
Then, a strategy-proof and individually rational social choice function f is FNP(W)
if and only if it satisfies the following condition: ∀i, θ−i, θ0, we have {f(θi, θ−i)|θi ∈
Θ} ⊇ {f(θi, θ−i ∪ {θ0})|θi ∈ Θ}. That is, with an additional other agent, the set of
outcomes that an agent can choose decreases or stays the same.
Proof. We first show that if f is FNP(W), then the condition must be satisfied. Suppose
not, that is, for some i, θ−i, θ0, there exists some o ∈ {f(θi, θ−i ∪ {θ0})|θi ∈ Θ} \
{f(θi, θ−i)|θi ∈ Θ}. Then, by assumption, there exists some θi ∈ Θ such that {o} =
argmaxo′∈O uθi(o
′). It follows that an agent facing type profile θ−i cannot obtain o
with a single report, but can obtain it by reporting both θ0 and some other type (such as,
by strategy-proofness, θi). Because o is her unique most-preferred outcome, she prefers
to engage in this manipulation, contradicting FNP(W).
Conversely, we show that if the condition is satisfied, then f is FNP(W). By as-
sumption, f is strategy-proof and individually rational, so we only need to check that
an agent has no incentive to use multiple identifiers. Suppose that o is an outcome that i
can obtain when facing θ−i by submitting multiple identities. Because the set of choices
is nonincreasing in the number of identifiers used according to the condition, it must be
that o ∈ {f(θi, θ−i)|θi ∈ Θ}. Hence, there is no reason for her to use more than one
identity.
